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Arbitration occupies "a space between business and politics."'
Technically, arbitration is an arrangement for submitting disputes to an impartial
decision-maker chosen by the parties. What this definition fails to convey is that
the term "arbitration" encompasses a vast array of processes that have long-
existed throughout the world as alternatives to judicial resolution of local
disputes. Despite arbitration's popularity in resolving disputes within countries,
until recently investors involved in disputes abroad relied primarily on formal
diplomatic intervention from their home countries to protect their investments.2
In the wake of the modem explosion of international trade and transnational
investment, however, arbitration has become "the accepted method for resolving
international business disputes."
3
The nature of investment in the People's Republic of China ("China" or
"PRC") and the role of law in China make international arbitration a particularly
attractive alternative for both foreign investors in China and Chinese
businesspersons. In spite of its popularity, however, arbitration in China's
emerging marketplace is still subject to many of the limitations that plague
China's court system-the same limitations that investors seek to avoid by
choosing arbitration.4 This paradox is the subject of this Essay.
The key to the paradox is that, while arbitration in China is imperfect, it
remains the best alternative for international investors. The purpose of this
Essay is to provide investors and practitioners with a realistic overview of the
strengths and limitations of international arbitration in China. Part I of this
Essay provides some general comments about the economic, social, and cultural
reasons why arbitration is a popular choice among both international investors
and Chinese nationals. We discuss how investors' enthusiasm about the
advantages of arbitration has blinded them to the significant role national courts
and laws play in arbitration in China. Part I concludes that arbitration can only
provide a partial solution to the ills of China's legal system. Part II examines
how the observations in Part I manifest themselves in recent developments
affecting arbitration in China. We examine the impact on arbitration of positive
and negative developments in Chinese law, Chinese international arbitral
institutions, and the Chinese national court system. Part III examines the range
1. YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 274 (1996). As a result
of arbitration's existence outside of established national legal systems and its confidential nature,
much scholarship about arbitration relies on anecdotal reports and assessments of actual arbitrations.
Indeed, Messrs. Dezalay and Garth's research strategy was based on interviews of almost three
hundred arbitrators and arbitrations specialists. Id. at 9.
2. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81
GEO. L. J. 535, 539 (1993).
3. DEzALAY & GARH, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Although this Essay examines disputes in China from the perspective of foreign investors,
it would be a mistake to imagine that only Chinese parties breach contracts with foreign trading
partners. See, e.g., CIETAC Decision Supports China Tire's position in Dalian Rubber Arbitration,
PR NEwswnziE, Nov. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BUSDTL File (describing
CIETAC award in favor of Chinese company and the Chinese company's surprise to find that
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. had improperly participated in the transfer of assets from a Sino-
foreign joint venture).
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of efforts by foreign investors and the U.S. Government to diminish and
eventually remove limitations on arbitration in China. Outsiders have used both
carrots and sticks in their efforts to strengthen Chinese arbitration.
I.
ARBITRATION'S POPULARITY IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DIsPUTEs IN CHINA
Investors going abroad view arbitration as a means of resolving disputes
outside a foreign country's court system. Certainly, some celebrated historical
arbitrations-the so-called "petroleum arbitrations 5 - support this notion. In-
deed, these dramatic international arbitrations seem to stand as beaming exam-
ples of how arbitration could provide a reliable alternative to potentially hostile
national courts. 6 Few in the profession will ever forget how Libya was forced to
arbitrate claims brought by multinational oil companies as a result of its nation-
alization of their interests in the 1970s.7 Libya claimed that its nationalization
decree invalidated the contracts with the oil companies, including the governing
arbitration provisions.8 Consequently, Libya argued, the oil companies could
only seek redress in Libya's national courts. Justifiably fearful of their chances
for success in Libya's national courts, the oil companies commenced arbitration
abroad and obtained awards against Libya.9 Initially, Libya refused to pay.
Faced with the prospect of seizure of its overseas assets, however, Libya eventu-
ally settled for tens of millions of dollars.' 0
As described below, several features of the petroleum arbitrations make
them somewhat anomalous. Thus, it would be a mistake to presume that arbitra-
tion in China will much resemble the high drama of these early arbitrations.
Arbitration in China remains intimately dependent on China's domestic courts
and national legal system.
A. Arbitration as a Private "Rule of Law"
Investors' consistent selection of arbitration as the dispute resolution mech-
anism of choice in China reflects both an appreciation of the shortcomings of
China's legal system and myopia about how those shortcomings affect arbitra-
tion in China. Headlines report daily that markets in Asia are the fastest grow-
ing in the world."' As a result, foreign investors-perhaps "smitten by the same
kind of opportunism that attracted Chinese immigrants one hundred years ago to
5. DE ZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 74-75 (noting that "the great petroleum arbitrations
occupy a quasi-mythical position" and are of "tremendous importance in the history and folklore of
arbitration.").
6. Id. at 75 ("They made arbitration known and recognized.").
7. See Barton & Carter, supra note 2, at 543.
8. See id.; see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 224-25.
9. Barton & Carter, supra note 2, at 543.
10. Id.
11. At press time, instead of rapidly expanding, Asian markets had been experiencing a great
deal of financial turmoil and, in some cases, collapse. These events highlight the magnitude of the
risks described in this Essay and the importance of protections for foreign investors.
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the United States' 'gold mountain,' 12--continue to pour investment dollars
into China. Surprisingly, the boom of foreign investment in China has occurred
despite what is generally regarded as inadequate legal protection for investors. '
3
Even more surprising, however, is investors' initially naive confidence that arbi-
tration will protect their Chinese investments. 14 Many investors appear aston-
ished to learn that international arbitration clauses in their multimillion dollar
contracts do not necessarily provide a viable means for resolving disputes or
protecting their investments.'
5
In making business plans and decisions, cautious investors evaluate both
the potential for profits and the attendant risks. In the highly entrepreneurial,
rapidly expanding Chinese marketplace, 16 the potential gains are staggering.
For this reason, some investors have discounted the high risks. 17 Whatever dis-
count exists, however, does not obviate questions about whether and to what
extent investments are legally protected. 18 The ability to answer these questions
with some degree of certainty often depends on how developed the "rule of law"
is in the place of investment. 19
12. See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection
and Predictability?, 34 VA. J. lMr'L L. 615, 616 (1994) (noting that "despite the potential for polit-
ical instability and the lack of protection, foreign investment in China continues to escalate
dramatically.").
13. Id.
14. See Stanley B. Lubman, Doing Business in China Could Give You a Big Mac Attack, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1995, at M2. In commenting about how McDonald's was prematurely evicted from
its 20-year lease at a desirable Beijing location, Mr. Lubman noted that Investor skepticism about the
wisdom of doing business in China "is long overdue-but it should not be exaggerated."
15. See, e.g., Dexter Roberts et al., Cheated in China?: More American Companies Turn to
Washington for Relief from Abuses, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6, 1997, at 142 ("U.S. companies that rushed
into China's far-flung provinces in the heady days of 1993 are discovering that local protectionism
and cronyism are making business a lot tougher than expected.") (emphasis added); Prepared State-
ment of Robert R. Aronson, Chairman, Ross manufacturing Corporation and RevPower Limited,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Trade, Fed-
eral News Service, Nov. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File (describing a
multimillion dollar investor's "shock" as he "began learning that China has a policy of non-enforce-
ment of arbitral awards in favor of foreigners") (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Robert P. O'Quinn, Beyond the MFN Debate: A Comprehensive Trade Strategy
Toward China, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., May 16, 1997, at 1 ("Today, the PRC ranks as the world's
third-largest economy and tenth-largest trading power."). Perhaps one reason for investors' head-
long investment into China is that when the rest of the world was in recession from 1990-92, China
attained and sustained an extraordinary growth rate; see also Lubman, supra note 14, at M2.
17. See Chew, supra note 12, at 621 (noting that "many U.S. businesses seem inclined to
minimize or overlook daunting financial and business problems that have plagued foreign investors
since China 'opened its doors' in the late 1970s and 1980s.").
18. See, e.g., Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 15 UCLA PAc. BAsIN L.J. 122, 122 (1996) ("The way China handles
[international business] disputes inevitably attracts the world's attention because it is an important
factor in determining whether economic ties between China and the rest of the world will continue to
expand.").
19. See Chew, supra note 12, at 638; Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New
World Order: Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1995, 1995 (1994) ("Among measures
that attract [foreign direct investment], an essential step is the establishment of a sound legal frame-
work that can assure a stable investment environment and enhance investors' confidence.").
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The term "rule of law" has many different meanings for different people
20
and there is even a great deal of debate about whether this concept should be
exported outside of the Western legal traditions from whence it came.2 ' For
most investors, however, and for the purposes of this Essay, 22 the term "rule of
law" is used to describe a legal system that guarantees minimum levels of cer-
tainty, predictability, and objectivity. Of these three, predictability is probably
the most important element because it allows investors to make informed deci-
sions about potential profits in relation to the attendant risks.
This observation leads back to one of the reasons for arbitration's popular-
ity in China. In China, the "rule of law" is still developing and is often held
hostage to local interests and biases.23 The biases or perceived biases of local
courts against foreign entities, especially entities whose claims or defenses could
have serious economic consequences for the locale of the dispute, are a world-
wide phenomenon. 24  In China, systematic protections against these biases in
local courts have been slow to emerge. Arbitration, at least in theory, provides
an alternative.25 Without being fully aware of its limitations, investors in China
have unquestioningly adopted arbitration as their dispute resolution choice. In
fact, one study revealed that, in making investment decisions, investors tend to
20. See generally Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Dis-
course, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) ("The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historic ideal, the
precise meaning of which may be less clear today than ever before."); Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism,
Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, 3 Soc. AND
LEGAL STUD. 195 (1994). In her article, Professor Jones identifies three main theories of the "rule of
law" and development of capitalism in modem society. First, there is what she terms the "modemi-
zation theory," which is based on the notion that Westem-style law and legal institutions are essen-
tial to the development of capitalism. Id. at 198-99. The second major theory is Max Weber's thesis
that capitalism is associated with formal legal rationality. Id. at 199-201. The third major theory,
which Professor Jones calls "Globalization," posits that the increasing interconnectedness of the
global marketplace will weaken local practices and customs, resulting in the spread of capitalism and
the "rule of law." Id. at 201-204.
2 1. See Jones, supra note 20. After describing how the term "rule of law" is a Western-centric
concept, Professor Jones argues that there is a unique style of Chinese capitalism, which defies
theories about the interconnectedness of the development of a capitalist economy and the develop-
ment of the "rule of law."
22. This Essay addresses the aspects of China's legal system relating to commerce and invest-
ment, not to other political and social issues, such as civil liberties in China.
23. See Chew, supra note 12, at 638.
24. In evaluating protectionism in China, it is important to note that the phenomenon is well
recognized in the United States as well. Provisions for diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts are
premised on the need to protect "foreign" parties against local biases operative in state courts. While
China is not unique in the fact of its protectionism, it is unique in the degree of its protectionism.
A striking example of the extremes of domestic Chinese courts' protectionism involves three
well-known American icons: Snap, Crackle, and Pop. When the Kellogg's company discovered
that Snap, Crackle, and Pop, along with Kellogg's logo, had been misappropriated to sell products
produced by a company in Meizhou in the Guangdong province, Kellogg's brought a lawsuit. The
Meizhou court ruled against Kellogg's and even concluded that Kellogg's should pay US$250,000 to
the Chinese company that had misappropriated its trademark. See Tim Wilson, New Power of Main-
land Mediators Puts Foreign Firms at Risk, ASLAN Bus., Mar. 1997, at 16. The Provincial High
Court later reversed the ruling. Id.
25. See ALBERT VAN DEN BERG, TRE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: To-
WARDS A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION 44 (198 1) ("The gist of the notion of arbitration as regulated by
most of the laws on arbitration is that it is conceived as a substitute for court litigation."); Protection
of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order, supra note 19, at 2007.
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add a substantial legal risk premium "'to reflect the contingent risk of subjection
to a foreign court rather than a neutral international forum."'
26
The perception that arbitration provides refuge against the uncertainties of
national courts is supported to some degree by the nature of arbitration and the
degree of control parties have in shaping arbitration proceedings. Arbitration
permits parties from two different countries to exercise a great deal of control
over how a dispute will be resolved.27 Parties can choose the place of arbitra-
tion, the nationality or qualifications of the arbitrators, and the language of arbi-
tration. Together, these three factors can go a long way toward neutralizing the
local biases that can influence a proceeding that is in a hostile jurisdiction, in a
foreign language, and before an adjudicator who may be more sympathetic to
the local party (or even hostile to the foreign party).2 8 In addition, the parties
can choose the applicable substantive law, thus sidestepping a country's
fledgling commercial law that may not provide the predictability investors seek.
Finally, almost all types of arbitration proceedings remain confidential.2 9
Through these controls over the dispute resolution process, parties appear able to
insulate themselves, at least partially, from real and perceived local biases of
national courts. In this way, parties see arbitration as a form of "private rule of
law. '
30
B. Limitations on Arbitration's Reliability
The parties' control of their legal destiny through arbitration is far from
absolute. Because it is inherently a private system of dispute resolution, interna-
tional arbitration does not (indeed cannot) supplant or function completely inde-
26. See Note, supra note 19, at 2007 & n.96 (citing Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in
International Investment Arbitration, ICSID REv.-FoREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 63 (1987)).
27. Apart from neutrality, flexibility is the primary advantage of arbitration. "[A]rbitration is
a broad enough term to encompass very different experiences." DEZALAY & GARTH, supra
note 1, at 273.
28. See Ge, supra note 18, at n.48 and related text.
29. Id.
30. The advantages of arbitration for foreign investors in China provide an interesting contrast
to the advantages of domestic arbitration in the United States. In the United States, domestic arbitra-
tion is chosen by parties because it is viewed as a more expeditious, economical, and informal
alternative to U.S. courts. See Henry P. DeVries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contrac-
tual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TuL. L. REv. 42, 61 (1982). In international arbitration, the
perceived advantages of U.S. arbitration are virtually nonexistent. Compared to its domestic coun-
terpart, international arbitration is prone to frequent delays because of distance and difficulties in
communication and language. The administrative costs associated with international arbitral tribu-
nals and corresponding arbitrator fees can be daunting, especially compared to the fact that an action
can be commenced in a national court for a nominal filing fee. For example, in arbitration under the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, when the sum in
dispute is, for example, $2,000,000, parties must pay $19,500 in administrative fees and a minimum
of $10,450 in fees per arbitrator, with a potential maximum of $45,000 per arbitrator. In China,
CIETAC recently raised its administrative fees, making them comparable to the ICC. See Stanley
Lubman, Moving from "No" to Yes: Arbitration in Joint-Venture Disputes, CHINA Bus. Rav., May-
June 1995, at 45.
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pendently of national court systems. 31  At bottom, any "rule of law" is
inextricably linked to the ruling power. The petroleum arbitrations involving
Libya provide a counter-example that is instructive as a starting point from
which to analyze where and when national courts and domestic legal systems
influence arbitration.
First, it is important to note that the petroleum arbitrations occurred outside
of Libya. Accordingly, Libyan laws governing the substance and procedures of
the conduct of arbitration and the powers of arbitrators (to the extent such laws
may have existed) did not affect the arbitral proceedings. By contrast, many
state-owned Chinese entities that enter into contracts with foreign investors in-
sist that the place of arbitration be China and that the contract designate a Chi-
nese arbitral institution to administer potential disputes.32 When arbitration
occurs in China, through an arbitration institution created by Chinese law, it is
inevitable that Chinese law and courts will affect the progress of that arbitration.
In this regard, China is situated similarly to other nations that host arbitration.
"In arbitration proceedings, national courts serve two functions: assistance
and control."' 3 3 National courts may be called upon to enforce the arbitration
agreement against a party who commences a lawsuit in contravention of the
agreement. In some instances, national courts can assist in the appointment,
revocation, or replacement of arbitrators.34 Moreover, the arbitration law of the
place of arbitration plays a significant role in governing the arbitration proceed-
ings.35 For example, local law will inevitably govern challenges to the validity
of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of the dispute. Local law may
also step in to fill gaps left open by unclear choice-of-law provisions.
In addition to the formal functions of national courts and legal frameworks,
there are informal ways in which arbitration is affected by its locale. Frequently,
arbitrators and legal advisors are drawn from the local legal community. The
professional approaches of arbitrators and the parties' advocates are inevitably
shaped by the legal system in which they were educated and trained.36 In turn,
these arbitrators and advocates' experiences affect the way they conduct or par-
ticipate in arbitration proceedings. 37 For these reasons, an arbitration conducted
in the United States under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce or UNCITRAL will likely be different in its
pace and procedures than arbitration under the same rules in, for example,
Thailand.
38
31. See DeVries, supra note 30, at 72 ("Though the most important principle of international
arbitration is the freedom of the parties to facilitate the process in accordance with their own expec-
tations, the process cannot be fully detached from any international law.").
32. See Lubman, supra note 30, at 45.
33. See DeVries, supra note 30, at 47 n.21.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 50.
36. See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 33-62.
37. Id.
38. When U.S. lawyers are involved in either domestic or international arbitration, the arbitra-
tion tends to take on a style similar to U.S. litigation. Id. at 54-55. They may seek discovery,
including depositions, document productions and interrogatories. The conduct of proceedings may
1997]
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Another factor that distinguishes the petroleum arbitrations from modem
arbitration in China is that the petroleum arbitrations were against a nation-state
(Libya), which had significant assets abroad. Most foreign investors in China
enter into contracts with municipal state-owned enterprises. State-owned enter-
prises are not very likely to have assets abroad. Consequently, an investor who
is able to obtain a favorable arbitration award against a Chinese party more often
than not will be forced to seek enforcement from Chinese courts. Thus, while a
foreign investor may be able to avoid Chinese courts in obtaining a favorable
award, the investor may ultimately be forced to resort to Chinese courts to real-
ize the benefits of the award.
Given the interrelatedness between arbitration and local laws, court sys-
tems, and legal communities, the ability of international arbitration to serve the
needs of international investors depends on developments (or setbacks) in the
"rule of law" in host countries. 3 9 Accordingly, arbitration cannot properly be
viewed as an escape from the uncertainties of developing legal systems. Rather,
it must be viewed as a buffer.
C. Arbitration and the Adversarial Process
Another reason for arbitration's popularity in China is the gap between
Chinese and Western legal traditions. While international trade always involves
trading partners from diverse cultural backgrounds, the distinction between East-
ern and Western legal traditions is much more pronounced than the distinctions
among different Western legal traditions. For example, Western contract law
defines contracts as agreements that bind parties. By contrast, the Chinese con-
ceive of contracts as relationships. 40 Arbitration helps bridge the gap between
East and West.
Moreover, the Western emphasis on the "rule of law" stands in stark con-
trast to what is often termed the "rule of relationships" operative in Asian socie-
ties.4 1 The Chinese "rule of relationships" model, often termed guanxi, is a sort
of gift economy that involves the "cultivation of personal networks of mutual
dependence and trust."' 4 2 The dichotomy between the "rule of law" and the
"rule of relationships" models poses many interesting questions. Regardless of
how interesting these questions are, however, investors are more concerned with
include dispositive motions and will probably include vigorous cross-examinations of witnesses. By
contrast, parties or arbitrators from Europe or Asia may refuse to permit such procedures and may
require that all affirmative evidence be submitted in the form of declarations.
39. The importance of some of the functions of national courts and laws has been somewhat
reduced through the promulgation and ratification of international treaties, such as the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958 ("The
New York Convention of 1958"), 21 U.S.T. 2517, and international commercial law, such as the
ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit. The New York Convention of 1958 is
an international treaty that obliges member countries to enforce foreign arbitral awards except in
certain limited circumstances in which the validity of the award may be called into question.
40. Roderick W. Macneil, Contract in China: Law, Practice, and Dispute Resolution, 38
STAN. L. REv. 303, 327 (1986).
41. See Jones, supra note 20, at 197.
42. Id.
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avoiding these questions than resolving them-at least when disputes arise re-
garding individual agreements. Arbitration provides parties with means to avoid
those questions, at least in part.
In contrast to the exalted status of the "rule of law" in Western societies,
law does not occupy the same position of importance in many Asian countries.
In fact, Chinese culture is distinctly averse to the use of law or lawsuits to re-
solve disputes.43 "Confucianism argues that legal principles and the legal sys-
tem are ethically and socially inferior ways to resolve problems. The law is the
last and most embarrassing resort, to be used only after rational dialog and moral
reasoning have failed."44 Or, as one commentator put it, "[tihe Chinese, per-
haps demonstrating a higher level of civilization than exists here, abhor litiga-
tion. Their traditional approach to resolving disputes has been through good
faith negotiation.
Arbitration is flexible enough that the form of the arbitration proceedings
agreed to by the parties can usually accommodate both parties' perceptions
about law and its role in resolving disputes.4 6 Arbitration is formal enough to
appeal to Western sensibilities, but has a time-honored place in Chinese history
and tradition. In this way, arbitration provides a forum and a process through
which both parties can agree to participate, even if they are unable to agree
about anything else.
II.
THE STATE OF ARBITRATION IN CHINA
The observations of Part I about the benefits and limitations of international
arbitration are clearly visible in a passing glance at recent developments affect-
ing arbitration in China. The premier international arbitration institution in
China is the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission,
commonly known by its acronym, CIETAC. 47 With no other arbitral institution
is the interplay between national legal and political systems, on the one hand,
and arbitral institutions, on the other hand, more apparent.
43. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 253-55.
44. Chew, supra note 12, at n.l 15. See also Barton & Carter, supra note 2, at 552 ("There is
possibly even a Confucian hesitance to rely on formal law and institutions for structuring society.");
Ge, supra note 18, at 128 (arguing that the importance of arbitration in resolving disputes in China is
rooted in Confucian teachings).
45. James D. Zirin, Confucian Confusion, FORBES, Feb. 24, 1997, at 136.
46. For example, Chinese arbitration (and litigation) procedures often include mediation initi-
ated and managed by the arbitrators (or judge). Macneil, supra note 40, at 330. This historical
hybridization of dispute resolution mechanisms in China is fundamentally opposed by American
legal professionals and basic American legal assumptions. The American legal tradition exerts
painstaking efforts to maintain the separateness of settlement and adjudication procedures and to
insulate adjudicators from the parties' settlement discussions.
47. There are two international arbitration bodies in China, CIETAC and the China Maritime
Arbitration Commission (known as "CMAC"), which together resolve virtually all international
business disputes. Ge, supra note 18, at 131. Although most to the issues raised in this Essay relate
equally to CIETAC and CMAC, for the sake of simplicity, we refer only to CIETAC because it is
the arbitral institution most commonly used.
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Many positive things can be said about the competence and relative inde-
pendence of China's foreign-related arbitration bodies. However, those institu-
tions exist within the larger framework of the Chinese legal system.
Consequently, CIETAC's long-term effectiveness will ultimately depend on the
manner and degree to which it is supported by the Chinese Government and the
extent to which China's national legal system evolves. This Part provides a
description of several legal developments, both positive and negative, affecting
arbitration in China over the past few years.
A. The New Arbitration Law
On September 1, 1995, the new Arbitration Law took effect. As the first
unified and relatively complete law on arbitration in the PRC, the Arbitration
Law brings welcome advances for the systems and procedures of arbitration in
China.4 8 The reforms brought by the Arbitration Law are the culmination of
three years of drafting4 9 and the consolidation of thirty years of experience in
arbitrating foreign-related business disputes in the PRC.5 ° Most changes intro-
duced by the Arbitration Law are procedural in nature and do not directly affect
the nature or proceedings of international arbitration organizations, such as
CIETAC. We summarize below the most significant provisions in the Arbitra-
tion Law.
51
1. Establishment of Independent Arbitration Commissions
The Arbitration Law establishes the institutional framework for the creation
of Arbitration Commissions that are administratively independent from the Chi-
nese Government. 5 2 The Arbitration Law also calls for the creation of the China
Arbitration Association, a non-governmental, self-regulating organization of the
Arbitration Commissions.53 Additional provisions describe the requirements for
the establishment of Arbitration Commissions, 54 the composition of the Arbitra-
tion Commissions, 55 and the qualifications for appointment of arbitrators. 56 To-
gether, these provisions legitimize arbitration as a process of adjudication that is
recognized by, but independent of, the Chinese Government. These advances
for domestic arbitration do not have any direct effect on international arbitration.
48. See, e.g., Ge Lui & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China:
History, New Developments, and Current Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539 (1995).
49. CHENG DEJUN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
COMMENTARY, CASES AN) MATERIALS 297 (1994).
50. Xiao Zhiming, The Commencement of the Arbitration Law, HONG KONG LAW., July 1995,
at 39 (on file with authors).
51. For a thorough and detailed discussion of the Arbitration Law, see generally CHENG ET
AL., supra note 49, and BEN BEAUMONT ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE CHINESE ARBrrRATION ACT
(1995).
52. See Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (Adopted at the Ninth Standing
Comm. Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on Aug. 31, 1994), art. 10-12, 14 [Herein-
after "Arbitration Law"].
53. Arbitration Law art. 15.
54. Arbitration Law ar. 11.
55. Arbitration Law art. 12.
56. Arbitration Law art. 13.
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Nevertheless, advances for domestic arbitration may hold some important conse-
quences for foreign investors who unwittingly end up before domestic
tribunals.
57
2. Special International Issues
Another significant aspect of the Arbitration Law is the inclusion of "spe-
cial provisions" that relate to the "arbitration of disputes involving a foreign
element and trade, transport and maritime interests."58 The significance of these
provisions is two-fold. First, reference to a "foreign element" legitimizes
CIETAC's expanded jurisdiction specified in Article 2 of the CIETAC Arbitra-
tion Rules.59 Second, by designating special provisions governing foreign-re-
lated arbitrations, the Arbitration Law affirms that, although China is
harmonizing domestic and foreign-related arbitration, the two types of arbitra-
tion are distinct enough to require some separate provisions. 60 Because China's
international arbitral tribunals are better established and more sophisticated, it is
important that they remain distinct from domestic arbitral tribunals, which do
not share CIETAC's reputation.
B. CIETA C's Prospering Institutional Reputation and Status
In addition to enhancement of the Arbitration Law, other trends bode well
for the continued and expanding prosperity of CIETAC as an arbitral institution.
CIETAC arbitral awards are generally enforced outside of China. CIETAC's
caseload has continued to increase rapidly, reaching an estimated 600 cases in
1996.61 At present, CIETAC has more arbitration cases than any other arbitra-
tion body in the world.62 The CIETAC list of potential arbitrators has expanded
to include younger arbitrators who have some exposure to foreign legal systems
and are more inclined than the senior bureaucrats they replace to find "legal"
rather than "practical" resolutions to disputes. 63 Other major breakthroughs are
CIETAC rule changes that permit foreign arbitrators to be included in the Panel
57. For a discussion of how foreign investors may end up before domestic Arbitration Com-
missions, see infra Part II.D.
58. Arbitration Law art. 65.
59. For additional discussion of and questions about CIETAC's expanded jurisdiction, see
infra Part i.D.
60. For a discussion of how a recent notice by the State Council undermines the significance
of the distinction drawn by the special provisions relating to foreign arbitration, see infra Part II.E.2.
61. This estimate is based on unofficial information obtained from the Beijing CIETAC Secre-
tariat. Even allowing for a possible margin of error, this number demonstrates a dramatic increase in
CIETAC's caseload from 1990, which was 238 cases. BEAUMONT ET AL., supra note 51, at 6 n.13.
This number is somewhat lower than the number of arbitration matters reported by official Chinese
news agencies, which put the number of cases accepted by CIETAC in 1995 at more than 900. Non-
Governmental Foreign Economic, Trade Ties Advance, XNHUA NEws AGENCY, Jan. 30, 1996,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, XINHUA File, Item No. 0130218.
62. China Tops Dispute League, THE FiN. TIms, Mar. 21, 1996, at 6.
63. See DEzALAy & GArH, supra note 1, at 279. "Legal solutions" are generally preferred by
foreign investors who rely on existing legal standards to draft and seek enforcement of their
contracts.
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of Arbitrators64 and foreign parties to use their own non-Chinese attorneys.
65
These changes have helped to bring the CIETAC Arbitration Rules more in line
with recognized international standards. 6 6 These developments, along with an
emerging track record, have led many to remark that CIETAC arbitration has
become much more sophisticated than in earlier days.
67
In addition to CIETAC's institutional composition, on September 4, 1995,
the China Chamber of International Commerce ("China CIC") adopted signifi-
cant amendments to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules. 68 While many of the
changes adopted by the amendments are too subtle to warrant comment in this
Essay,69 other changes are likely to have important consequences for interna-
tional arbitration in China.
One of the more interesting changes is the expansion of CIETAC's juris-
diction. 70  This amendment was introduced in response to designation of
CIETAC by the Chinese Securities Supervision as the official arbitration institu-
tion for handling securities disputes arising between or among China's securities
firms and the securities exchange agency. 7 1 One observer expects a "sharp in-
crease" in the number of securities related matters brought before CIETAC,72
probably as a result of the expanded securities jurisdiction.
Another significant change conforms the CIETAC Arbitration Rules to the
Arbitration Law. The amendments stipulate that any objection to the validity of
an arbitration agreement or to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal shall
be raised before the initial hearing of the Arbitration Tribunal or in the initial
substantive defense.7 3 When the parties dispute the validity of the arbitration
agreement and raise the issue both before the Arbitration Tribunal and a Peo-
ple's Court, the decision of the People's Court will prevail if the Arbitration
Tribunal's conclusion is different. This amendment conforms the CIETAC Ar-
bitration Rules to the Arbitration Law, which contains virtually identical
provisions.74
64. Ge, supra note 18, at 132 & n.54 (citing CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 10).
65. Id. at 132 & n.57 (citing CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 22).
66. Id. at 131-32 & n.52.
67. See id.; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 1, at 278-79.
68. The China CIC is authorized under Article 73 of the Arbitration Law to promulgate rules
governing foreign-related arbitrations. See Jingzhou Tao, CIETAC Modifies its Arbitration Rules,
AsIA PAC. F. NEWSL., Winter 1995, at 11. For further discussion on possible limitations of China
CIC's power under Article 73, see infra Part II.E.2.
69. For example, several of the changes will not affect the English translation. See Tao, supra
note 68, at 11-12.
70. See CIETAC ARErrRATION RLnEs (1995) ("CIETAC ARB. RuLEs") art. 2. The following
language was added to Article 2: "If the laws or administrative legislation of the People's Republic
of China include special provisions or special authorisation concerning the scope of a case accepted
for hearing by the arbitration Commission, the Arbitration Commission may hear the case in pursu-
ant to these special provisions or special authorisation."
71. See Tao, supra note 68, at 12.
72. See Lui & Lourie, supra note 48, at 542.
73. See CIETAC ARB. RuLEs, arts. 4 & 6.
74. See Arbitration Law art. 20.
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C. Enforcement of Awards
Notwithstanding the positive developments discussed in Parts II.A. & B.,
the effectiveness of arbitration in China remains severely hampered. For foreign
parties seeking to vindicate their rights through arbitration, obtaining a favorable
arbitral award is only the first step in a long and precarious process. The en-
forcement problems are legendary for victorious parties seeking to enforce
awards in China." Despite the limited grounds upon which a Chinese court can
legitimately deny enforcement of an arbitral award,7 6 prevailing parties are rou-
tinely unable to enforce arbitral awards.
For example, in response to an article regarding investment in China, Mr.
Andre G. Gigon, Director of the French company, Tetras S.A., felt compelled to
warn potential investors in a letter to the editor about "risks relate[d] to problem-
solving."'77 Mr. Gigon's company, Tetras, won an arbitration award against a
Chinese company. A Chinese court even agreed, in principle, that the award
was binding, "[y]et the court refused to notify the parties of its ruling, thus
blocking the enforcement mechanism and the execution of the award."' 78 Based
on this experience, Mr. Gigon warned that investors should "be aware of the
behavior of the Chinese judicial system .... The possibility of arbitration to
secure binding solutions to international commercial disputes cannot be
comforting."79
Mr. Gigon's story is not unique. Mr. Robert R. Aronson, Chairman of
RevPower Limited, described how he was "shocked" by the delay tactics he
encountered when trying to enforce a $9 million arbitral award issued by the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce against a Chinese party.80 "When we filed
the award with the Shanghai Court, the court refused to give us a receipt for the
award, or a case number, and for the next two years refused to even acknowl-
75. See, e.g., Chew, supra note 12, at 639 (noting that "the value of [CIETAC arbitration
awards] is questionable because Chinese courts routinely refuse to enforce awards entered against
Chinese defendants.").
76. See Civil Procedure Law art. 20 (PRC). Specifically, Article 260 provides:
If the party against whom the enforcement is sought presents evidence which
proves that the arbitration award made by the foreign-related arbitration institution of
the People's Republic of China involves one of the following circumstances, the Peo-
ple's Court shall, after examination and verification by a collegial bench formed by
the People's Court, rule to refuse the enforcement of the award:
the parties have neither included an arbitration clause in their contract nor subse-
quently concluded a written arbitration agreement;
the party against whom the enforcement is sought was not notified to appoint an
arbitrator or to take part in the arbitration proceedings or the party against whom the
enforcement is sought was unable to state his opinions due to reasons for which he is
not responsible;
the formation of the arbitral [institution] or the arbitration procedure was not in
conformity with the rules of arbitration; or
the matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or
are beyond the authority of the arbitration institution.
77. Andre G. Gigon, China: Enter at Your Own Risk, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Prepared Statement of Robert R. Aronson, supra note 15.
19971
342 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
edge that the award existed."8 1 In the meantime, again to Mr. Aronson's shock
and dismay, soon after RevPower received the award, the Chinese party started
"transferring its business and assets to its parent . . . and grandparent
[companies]."82
Enforcement remains one of the most difficult and uncertain aspects of ar-
bitration in China.83 In some instances, arbitral awards are denied enforcement
because local courts come under significant pressure from local government au-
thorities.8 4 Other times, even if enforcement is not expressly denied, the practi-
cal effect is the same because the People's Court fails to actively enforce the
award. Even when People's Courts issue orders requiring enforcement of arbi-
tral awards, such orders are only pieces of paper that are dependent for execu-
tion on the often-elusive cooperation of local officials. 85 Enforcement at this
point in the process is impaired because Chinese courts, especially their enforce-
ment divisions, are critically underfunded.
86
To the extent that the problems of enforcement result from a lack of gui-
dance from the Chinese Government, the Supreme People's Court has recently
offered some relief. In a decision handed down in August 1995, the Supreme
Court instructed that lower courts may no longer overturn independent arbitral
awards without the approval of a higher-level court.87 However, the Supreme
Court's decision falls short of directing or requiring lower People's Courts to
enforce arbitral awards. Moreover, it is doubtful that one pronouncement by
the Supreme Court can go far in curbing local practices that are firmly en-
trenched and politically motivated. 88 Finally, as noted above, outright denial of
an application to enforce an award is only one of the mechanisms used to pre-
vent a prevailing party from executing an arbitral award.
Notwithstanding these points, the Supreme Court's decision may provide
prevailing parties some chance at success by partially insulating enforcement
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Parties seeking to enforce in China foreign awards rendered outside of China have the
benefit of the New York Convention of 1958. Although the New York Convention of 1958 contains
provisions substantially similar to those under Article 20 of the Arbitration Law, as a practical matter
the effect is often the same.
84. See Stanley Lubman, Setback for China.Wide Rule of Law, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 7,
1996, at 38.
85. See generally BEAUMONr ET A.., supra note 51, at 3-4 (describing political and economic
factors that reduce the likelihood of enforcement of arbitral awards in China).
86. Matthew D. Bersani, Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in China: Foreigners Find the
System Sorely Lacking, CHINA Bus. REV., May 1992, at 7. In order to enforce an award, court
personnel must usually travel to the non-performing party's local court to coordinate enforcement
efforts. Id. To facilitate this travel, court personnel often request that the foreign company holding
the arbitral award cover travel costs. Id. U.S. parties can be punished under U.S. laws relating to
corrupt overseas business practices if they comply with the court personnel's request, but suffer
delay or outright refusal to enforce their award if they don't. Id.
87. Dispute Resolution, CINA ECON. REV., Mar. 1996, at 23.
88. In fact, it is generally believed that the provincial areas of the PRC are not always under
the control of the central Chinese Government. Cf BEAtuMor ET AL., supra note 51, at 3-4 (propos-
ing the creation of an Arbitration Court to oversee all procedural matters relating to arbitration,
including the creation of enforcement mechanisms such as bailiffs).
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decisions against the most extreme local pressures operative in lower People's
Courts. More importantly, the decision indicates recognition by the Chinese
Government that national oversight is necessary in the enforcement of arbitral
awards. Despite the uncertainty regarding enforcement of arbitral awards, some
remain hopeful about recent progress in the area of enforcement.89 The
Supreme Court's recognition of the need for central oversight of enforcement
will hopefully prompt legislation that creates better enforcement procedures.
D. Curtailing the Scope of CIETAC's Jurisdiction
Another factor restricting the availability of international arbitration is am-
biguity surrounding CIETAC's jurisdiction. Significant controversy has long
existed regarding CIETAC's jurisdiction. The 1989 version of the CIETAC Ar-
bitration Rules defined CIETAC's subject matter in general terms, providing
that CIETAC's jurisdiction extended to "disputes arising from international eco-
nomic and trade transactions. ' 9° Under this ambiguous statement of jurisdic-
tion, a debate developed about whether CIETAC, as an international arbitral
body, could exercise jurisdiction over disputes between two Chinese entities,
and if so, under what circumstances. This debate holds potentially significant
consequences for many foreign investors because Chinese-foreign joint ventures
are deemed to constitute Chinese legal persons under Chinese joint venture
law.9 '
The 1995 revisions to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules attempted to resolve
the debate by extending CIETAC's subject matter jurisdiction to "disputes
which arise in areas of . . . international or foreign economic relations and
trade."' 9 2 This provision was generally interpreted to permit CIETAC to assume
jurisdiction over "external" or "foreign-related" (shewai) disputes, even if such
89. See, e.g., David Samuels, All Change in China, Ir, r'L COM. Lm., Apr. 1996, at 13 (re-
porting about law firm Clifford Chance's success in enforcing an arbitration award). In addition,
after its concerted campaign to publicize the difficulties encountered in attempting to enforce its
arbitration award, discussed above, supra Part Il.C., RevPower received private messages from the
Chinese embassy in November 1995, suggesting that RevPower again try to enforce the award. How
to Cope When Things Go Wrong In China-The RevPower Dossier, INT'L CoM. LrrG., Apr. 1996,
at 14-15. This time, the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court acknowledged receipt of the award
and acknowledged that it was still enforceable despite the time lapse. Id. Chinese television even
broadcast the Shanghai People's Court decision, presumably to showcase the decision to investors
abroad. Id.
90. CIETAC ARB. RULEs (1989) (on file with authors).
91. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures,
art. 2, (1988).
92. See CImNG ET AL.., supra note 49, at 28, 308. CIETAC ARB. RuLEs art 2. The full text of
Article 2 provides:
[CIETAC] will use arbitration as a means of independently and impartially resolving
disputes which arise in areas of contractual or non-contractual international or foreign
economic relations and trade between foreign legal entities and/or natural persons and
Chinese legal entities and/or natural persons, between foreign legal entities and/or
natural persons, between Chinese legal entities and/or natural persons. Such arbitra-
tion will be undertaken in order to safeguard the legal rights and interests of the
parties concerned and to promote the development of domestic and international eco-
nomics and trade.
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disputes involve only two domestic Chinese legal persons, as long as the dis-
putes also involve a significant "foreign element" (shewai yinsu).9 3 This revi-
sion was heralded as an important change that expanded the scope of CIETAC's
jurisdiction.
In 1996, the Shanghai Municipal Intermediate People's Court rendered a
judgment that raises serious doubts about the accuracy of this interpretation.
The underlying dispute arose between Shanghai Light Industrial Corporation
("Shanghai Corporation") and a Hong Kong-based company called Today's
World Co. Ltd. The dispute involved a claim for payment for certain services
provided by Shanghai Corporation to a Chinese-foreign joint venture between
the two companies, called Shanghai Today's World Gourmet Co. Ltd. ("Today's
World"). 95 The services were provided pursuant to a contract that was ancillary
to the joint venture contract and that contained no arbitration clause.9 6
Notwithstanding an arbitration clause in the joint venture contract, Shang-
hai Corporation filed a claim for damages against Today's World in the Shang-
hai Municipal First Intermediate People's Court. Despite vigorous jurisdictional
objections by Today's World, the Intermediate Court held, and the Higher Peo-
ple's Court later affirmed,97 that a People's Court could exercise jurisdiction
over the dispute.
The jurisdictional holding appears to have been made in the alternative. In
its first alternative holding, the Court concluded that the dispute arose under the
ancillary contract, which contained no arbitration agreement. This holding is
not controversial as it is consistent with the recognized grounds for refusing to
enforce an arbitral award.
98
The second alternative holding, however, is more troubling. In this alterna-
tive holding, the Court concluded that exercise of jurisdiction by the People's
Court was appropriate because CIETAC could not exercise jurisdiction over a
dispute that arose between two Chinese legal persons over a domestic con-
tract.99 This holding is disturbing because it suggests that disputes arising under
most ancillary contracts between Chinese-foreign joint ventures and their Chi-
nese partners cannot be brought before CIETAC. Troubling as it is, however,
93. See Ge, supra note 18, at 132; CmNG r ETAL., supra note 49, at 28, 308; Lui & Lourie,
supra note 48, at 559. This expanded jurisdiction is echoed in the Arbitration Law's provisions
governing foreign-related arbitration. Specifically, Article 65 of the Arbitration Law describes the
special provisions governing foreign arbitration to apply to the arbitration of disputes involving
"foreign economics and trade, transport and maritime interests." ARBrrRATION LAW art. 65.
94. See Clement Au-Yeung et al., Joint Venture Dispute Triggers Jurisdictional Concerns,
CHINA LAW & PRAc., Feb. 1996, at 24.
95. Id. at 24-25.
96. Id. at 25-26.
97. Id. at 26.
98. See Civil Procedure Law art. 260(1) (PRC).
99. It should be noted that the parties eventually agreed to refer the dispute to the Shanghai
Commission of CIETAC, where counterclaims, including one for termination of the joint venture
contract, were raised. See Case Update: Shanghai Joint Venture Dispute Lingers On, CHINA LAW
& PRAc., June 1996, at 47.
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this conclusion has been echoed by CIETAC itself,1° ° and by People's Courts
that have been asked to enforce arbitration agreements.'
0t
This crabbed interpretation of CIETAC's jurisdiction will likely have seri-
ous consequences for investors. Chinese-foreign joint ventures and their Chi-
nese partners often enter into ancillary contracts for services to be provided to
the joint venture or for land use. If these service and land contracts are regarded
as domestic contracts, then disputes between the joint venture and the Chinese
party will not be subject to CIETAC's jurisdiction. Because it is an issue of
* CIETAC's jurisdiction, parties will not have the option of avoiding this conse-
quence by agreement. Moreover, this new interpretation of CIETAC's jurisdic-
tion will have the affect of nullifying parties' choice of arbitration already
provided for in contracts that predate this decision. Parties who thought they
selected CIETAC arbitration to govern disputes arising out of these ancillary
contracts will no doubt be disappointed to find themselves in domestic arbitra-
tion 10 2 or in People's Courts.
E. State Council Notice
Compounding the problems of CIETAC's curtailed jurisdiction, a June 8,
1996 notice from the State Council ("State Council Notice' ) 103 will likely have
a profound effect on the reliability and continued vitality of arbitration in China.
The State Council Notice contains three significant provisions, the net effect of
which is to end CIETAC's long-standing exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-
related disputes and to make it more difficult for parties to designate CIETAC in
arbitration clauses in standard-form government contracts.
1. Validity of Arbitration Agreements
Article 1 of the State Council Notice states that if the arbitration body se-
lected by the parties in an arbitration clause has been terminated, the clause is
100. One of the authors of this Essay was personally involved in a similar case in which
CIETAC issued a ruling that declined to exercise jurisdiction over a similar dispute involving an
ancillary contract for land and services. In declining to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute be-
tween a joint venture and the joint venture's Chinese partner, CIETAC rejected arguments that the
dispute involved a "foreign element" even though the joint venture was primarily funded by foreign
investment, the joint venture was primarily managed by foreign personnel and the joint venture was
created to manufacture automobiles for domestic and export markets. This decision by CIETAC,
and the inevitability of similar decisions in the future, suggests that parties will no longer have the
option of agreeing to submit disputes arising out of ancillary contracts to CIETAC, as Shanghai
Corporation and Today's World did.
101. For example, the Beijing court refused to enforce an arbitrated agreement made between
the Beijing Lido Holiday Inn Hotel and the China International Engineering Co. The court's deci-
sion was based on its finding that, as a Chinese company, the hotel could not avail itself of
CIETAC's jurisdiction and was instead required to apply for domestic arbitration. Wilson, supra
note 24, at 16.
102. In the words of one investor who found out the hard way, "[m]ake sure you have an
international arbitration agreement in your contract. If you get sucked into local arbitration, you're a
dead duck." Charles Olivier,, China, CoRP. LOCATION, May/June 1997, at 54, 55.
103. Circular of the General Office of the State Council Regarding Several Issues Which Need
to be Clarified in Relation to the Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of
China, dated June 8, 1996.
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still valid and can provide the basis for acceptance of the case by a domestic
Arbitration Commission. This provision has been criticized as inconsistent with
the Arbitration Law.' ° 4 The criticism arises because Articles 16 and 18 of the
Arbitration Law provide that an arbitration agreement is void if the parties do
not clearly designate a specific Arbitration Commission.' 0 5 An arbitration
agreement void under these provisions of the Arbitration Law would neverthe-
less be considered valid and enforceable under the State Council Notice.
2. Jurisdiction of Domestic Arbitration Commissions Over Foreign-
Related Arbitration Cases
Other significant provisions that will affect foreign investors are found in
Article 3 of the State Council Notice. Under these provisions, domestic Arbitra-
tion Commissions now have the power to accept foreign-related arbitrations
when the parties have agreed to submit disputes to such Arbitration Commis-
sions. Until this pronouncement, CIETAC was regarded as having exclusive
jurisdiction over foreign-related arbitral disputes1 0 6 and Chinese law treated for-
eign-related and domestic arbitration as separate and distinct.
10 7
Cross pollenizing foreign-related arbitration matters with domestic Arbitra-
tion Commissions creates several ambiguities regarding application of the Arbi-
tration Law and the Civil Procedure Code. Confusion will be the likely
result.1 0 8 For example, it is uncertain whether foreign-related disputes adjudi-
cated by domestic Arbitration Commissions will be governed by the procedures
for domestic arbitration or foreign-related arbitration. If domestic arbitration
procedures were applied by domestic Arbitration Commissions to foreign-re-
lated arbitrations, arguably such application would be at odds with Article 73 of
the Arbitration Law. Article 73 designates the China CIC as the body responsi-
ble for formulating, in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code, rules gov-
erning foreign-related arbitration. ' 9 Article 3 of the State Council Notice
suggests that the China CIC's power to do so may be undermined or limited by
domestic arbitration provisions.
With respect to enforcement of arbitral awards, it is uncertain whether an
award rendered by a domestic Arbitration Commission in a foreign-related arbi-
tration will be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law pertaining
to enforcement of domestic arbitral awards1 10 or whether the provisions pertain-
104. See CIETAC BULLETIN, dated July 23, 1996 (on file with authors).
105. See Arbitration Law art. 16(3) ("An arbitration agreement shall contain the following par-
ticulars... (3) the chosen arbitration commission."); Arbitration Law art. 18 ("Where an arbitration
agreement has not specified clearly . . . the choice of an arbitration commission, the parties con-
cerned may conclude a supplementary agreement. If a supplementary agreement cannot be reached,
the arbitration agreement shall be void.").
106. See Lubman, supra note 84, at 38.
107. For example, Chapter 7 of the Arbitration Law contains special provisions for arbitration
involving foreign elements. See Arbitration Law art. 65-73.
108. See Wilson, supra note 24, at 16.
109. See CIETAC BuLLE', supra note 104.
110. See Arbitration Law art. 58-61.
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ing to enforcement of foreign-related arbitral awards apply."' Questions also
exist about whether, in the context of enforcement proceedings, courts of foreign
countries will recognize the jurisdiction of domestic Arbitration Commissions
over foreign-related arbitrations.' l2 The most notable distinction between the
domestic and foreign-related provisions regarding enforcement of arbitral
awards is that with domestic arbitral awards, People's Courts can review the
legal reasoning supporting the award.' 13 If courts can review the legal reason-
ing of arbitral awards, they will lose the finality that has thus far attracted for-
eign investors. This ambiguity makes it more difficult for investors to know
what to expect if their agreements should end up in arbitration in China.
3. Dispute Resolution Clauses In Standard-Form Government Contracts
Perhaps the most ominous provisions of the State Council Notice are those
that require all standard-form government contracts, interpreted to mean most
trade contracts, 114 to be revised to incorporate one of two model arbitration
clauses. The first option requires that the parties specify an Arbitration Com-
mission. The text of the State Council Notice does not expressly preclude selec-
tion of CIETAC and CMAC as the specified Arbitration Commission.
However, by failing to mention these foreign arbitration bodies specifically, the
State Council implicitly suggests that standard form contracts should designate
only domestic Arbitration Commissions.' 15 The second option is a model
clause providing that any disputes arising out the contract be resolved in the
People's Court.
It is anticipated that introduction of these model clauses will reduce the
ability of foreign investors to designate CIETAC as the body governing poten-
tial disputes and will increase the likelihood that foreign parties will end up
arbitrating before domestic Arbitration Commissions or litigating disputes in
People's Courts.1 16 Prior to this provision, foreign investors generally had little
or no choice but to agree to CIETAC arbitration because standard contracts and
Chinese negotiators invariably insisted on arbitration in China.' 17 The lack of
choice was not too problematic because CIETAC was generally considered the
most reliable and independent arbitral body in China. In light of this State
Council Notice, however, the same lack of choice may have dramatically differ-
ent consequences. Now, Chinese negotiators armed with the State Council No-
tice will most likely prevent foreign investors from resorting to CIETAC and
instead force them into domestic arbitration.
111. See Arbitration Law art. 70; Civil Procedure Code art. 260 (PRC).
112. See CIETAC BULLETIN, supra note 104.
113. See Arbitration Law art. 58 (PRC) (providing that an arbitral award can be set aside if an
award is made that "perverted the course of justice.").
114. See Lubman, supra note 84, at 38.
115. See CIETAC BULLEIN, supra note 104. In his commentary on the subject, Mr. Lubman
suggests that, while the model arbitration clauses do not preclude selection of CIETAC or CMAC, as
a practical matter they will make it exceedingly difficult for foreign investors to insist on designation
of CIETAC. See Lubman, supra note 84, at 38.
116. Lubman, supra note 84, at 38.
117. Lubman, supra note 30, at 45.
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III.
EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO BOOST THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CHINESE ARBITRATION
When China opened its doors to foreign investment in 1978 after being
ravaged by the Cultural Revolution, "the country lacked virtually any of the
indicia of a formal legal system." 1 8 Today, China stands transformed. This
metamorphosis is due primarily to the passage of "an extraordinary range" of
both national and local legislation to encourage and regulate international busi-
ness. 119 Unfortunately, China's court system remains the weak link in China's
evolving legal environment for foreign investment.1 2 0 Arbitration in China is
directly tied to China's court system and will always be subject, at least in part,
to its limitations.
Given the importance to the world economy of China's vast and expanding
markets, investors and foreign nations have not been content to simply wait and
see what will happen. Both individual investors and foreign nations have an
ongoing dialogue with the Chinese Government about what is expected and
hoped for in China's legal system. Outsiders have employed both the carrot and
stick approaches.
A. Carrots
The international community has offered several forms of encouragement
and vehicles for reform to China's legal system. Much of the assistance has
come in the form of advisors and legal expertise. For example, as part of the
U.S.-China summit in November 1997, the United States and China agreed to
establish a joint liaison group pursuing cooperation on development of China's
legal system. 12 1 The joint liaison group will focus on training judges and law-
yers, exchanging legal experts, and developing arbitration procedures.' 22
Perhaps the biggest enticement for China is admission to the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). For years, this prize has been dangled just out of
China's reach. Among the reasons cited for further delaying China's admittance
to the WTO is China's spotty record in honoring international arbitration
awards. 123 Other potential sources for reform in the Chinese legal system in-
clude Chinese participation in the ICC (which is predicted to increase respect by
Chinese companies for international arbitral awards). 1 24
118. Jerome A. Cohen, ABA Committee of Corporate General Counsel Hears Report on China:
China's Progress in Business Law, METROPOLITAN CORP. CourNs., Mar. 1996, at 39.
119. Id.
120. Id
121. The White House, Fact Sheet: Accomplishments of the U.S.-China Summit, M2 PRESS-
WIRE, Nov. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File.
122. Id.
123. Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Hearing Before the House Sub-
comms. on Asia and the Pacific and on Int'l Econ. Pol. of the House Comm. on Int'l Rel., 104th
Cong. 164 (1996) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
124. Jean-Charles Rouher, former Secretary General of the ICC, Chinese Move on Arbitration,
FIN. TtMEs (LoNDoN), Jan. 6, 1995, Letters to the Editor, at 12.
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B. Sticks
Not all problems encountered with arbitration in China are dealt with
through gentle encouragement of Chinese legal institutions. Some foreign in-
vestors frustrated with their treatment in obtaining or seeking to enforce arbitral
awards in China are driven to more hard-nosed measures. Investors are turning
to the U.S. Government and Embassy in Beijing to put pressure on the Chinese
Government. "The American Embassy [in Beijing] has seen a big jump in com-
plaints over the past six months from disgruntled U.S. companies fed up with
their lack of protection under China's legal system."
'' 2 5
Examples of entreaties to the U.S. Embassy abound. For instance, the
Kimberly-Clark Corporation sought intervention from the U.S. Embassy after an
appeal to local officials failed to prevent the manager of Kimberley-Clark's joint
venture from operating a rival factory making similar products with materials
wrongfully diverted from Kimberly-Clark's factory.' 26 In another example, the
U.S. govermnent intervened in a case involving a U.S. investor whose store and
small factory had been closed down so that Municipal Officials could use the
location for redevelopment.' 2 7 In yet another example, Chicago-based Borg-
Warner Automotive Inc., an auto parts manufacturer, sought assistance from the
U.S. Embassy in appealing a judgment of a Shiyan court awarding all of Borg-
Warner's joint venture assets, 60% of which originally came from Borg-Warner,
to the joint-venture's Chinese partner.12 8 The outrageous aspect of the case is
the fact that the entire suit was conducted by the general manager of the joint
venture, who represented both the joint venture and the Chinese partner through-
out the proceedings.'
2 9
Another strategy disgruntled foreign investors have employed is public
condemnation. The most notable illustration of this tactic is provided by Mr.
Aronson of RevPower. After being unable to enforce a multimillion dollar arbi-
tral award rendered in favor of his company, 130 Mr. Aronson began a publicity
campaign to "broadcast" the problems he had encountered. Mr. Aronson con-
tacted four senators and ten congresspersons, all of whom wrote letters to the
Chinese Embassy in Washington.' 3 1 He also hired an expert attorney to conduct
a structured publicity campaign.132 Mr. Aronson himself has testified before
Congress on several issues relating to U.S.-China trade relations.
125. Roberts et al., supra note 15, at 142.
126. Id. at 143.
127. U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, China Investment Climate Statement for 1997,
INT'L MARK.ET INsIGHT REP., July 15, 1997, 63, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, INTMKT
File.
128. Roberts et at., supra note 15, at 143.
129. Id. It is interesting to note that foreign investors' reliance on assistance from the U.S.
Embassy hearkens back to the days before the popularity of international arbitration, when diplo-
matic intervention by the investors' home country provided protection for investments. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
131. How to Cope, supra note 89, at 14-15.
132. Id.
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The most strident pressures on China relate to the most serious problem:
enforcement of arbitral awards. A bill entitled "International Arbitration En-
forcement Act of 1997" is currently pending before Congress.' 33 The bill is
essentially an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. t 34 The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act permits U.S. persons to execute international
arbitration awards against foreign states or state-owned enterprises through fed-
eral district courts.' 35 The International Arbitration Enforcement Act would
permit U.S. parties to collect the value of their arbitral award (plus interest) from
a foreign state that refused or failed to enforce an arbitral award for which en-
forcement was sought pursuant to the New York Convention of 1958.
The value of this legislation is that, most often, the Chinese state-owned
enterprises against which arbitral awards are rendered do not have assets in the
United States against which U.S. award holders can execute their award. The
International Arbitration Enforcement Act of 1997 creates civil liability for
countries that are members of the New York Convention of 1958 on the theory
that a court's refusal to enforce an award in violation of the Convention is a
breach of the Convention by the nation in which the court resides.1 36 By pro-
viding a means for enforcing arbitral awards outside of China, the International
Arbitration Enforcement Act seeks to create the same leverage that was avail-
able to the oil companies in the petroleum arbitrations against Libya.
IV.
CONCLUSION
We are not in a position to predict which efforts by foreign investors and
the United States will have the most significant effect on the stability and relia-
bility of international arbitration in China. Instead, in closing we offer a few
observations about the backdrop against which the external efforts described
above in Parts Ill.A. and B. are being made.
As a starting point, it is significant that the Chinese Government actively
acknowledges the fact that China must improve its protections for foreign in-
vestments in order to continue attracting those investments.' 37 This acknowl-
edgment suggests that, whatever form external efforts to affect China's legal
system take, the Chinese Government will be watching and evaluating.
It is also important to factor in the unlikelihood that investors would ever
completely abandon the markets of China, despite the continuing handicaps of
133. H.R. 2141, 105th Cong. (1997).
134. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
135. See id. at § 1610.
136. See Prepared Statement of Robert R. Aronson, supra note 15.
137. See, e.g., Non-Governmental Foreign Economic, Trade Ties Advance, supra note 61 (re-
porting that Guo Dongpo, President of the CCPIT, "pointed out that foreign arbitration, mediation
and trademark agency services carried out by the CCPrr have helped to improve China's investment
climate."); How to Cope, supra note 89, at 14-15.
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China's dispute resolution mechanisms.' 38 Even RevPower, the company most
vocal in advocating the stick approach, has stated that it would again invest in
China once its arbitral award has been enforced.
1 39
Together, the Chinese Government's concern and investors' continued in-
terest in Chinese markets suggests that the two will remain wary partners in the
project of increasing the protections in China for foreign investments. Arbitra-
tion has a critical role in that project. As a semi-autonomous mechanism for
dispute resolution, arbitration offers a forum for the continued dialogue between
the Chinese government, Chinese business entities, and foreign investors about
the nature and extent of protections for foreign investments in China. Investors
facing significant roadblocks to vindicating their claims may yearn for the type
of force-fed arbitration that proved so effective against Libya. Ultimately, how-
ever, extranational efforts, if indeed they are even completely possible,1 40 will
not by themselves produce the necessary reforms within China. Engagement,
though it may not be voluntary, is necessary to the development of a stronger,
more reliable system of arbitration in China.
Foreign investors in China are beginning to regard their investments as
profit-making endeavors, not simply as feet in the door to access future markets.
The examples in this Essay demonstrate investors expressing shock and dismay,
as opposed to mere resignation, in response to the problems they have encoun-
tered in pursuing arbitration in China. As a result of these higher expectations,
investors are less willing simply to "write off' invested capital when a dispute
arises. Instead, they will be looking more carefully at the protections that exist
for their investments. Because arbitration is the primary method of dispute reso-
lution, developments in arbitration will inevitably be at the heart of their focus.
138. See, e.g., Fiona Thompson, Dabhol Debacle Dents Foreign Investors' Confidence, PETRO-
LEUM ECONOMIST, Nov. 1995, at 6 (discussing the competition between India and other countries in
Asia for investment dollars).
139. Olivier, supra note 102, at 55. Other investors who can tell nightmare stories about ven-
tures in China nevertheless continue their business activities there. For example, despite the trouble
experienced by Kimberly-Clark, discussed supra note 126 and accompanying text, the company
plans to expand its operations in China. Roberts et al., supra note 15, at 143. In an even more
astonishing example, one company, whose Chinese partner cut and pasted a crude photocopy of the
foreign manager's signature onto a radically different feasibility study, still remains in business with
the same Chinese partner. Olivier, supra note 102, at 54.
140. As noted above, in negotiating contracts with Chinese entities, foreign investors usually
have little leverage to demand clauses calling for arbitration outside of China. See supra note 117
and accompanying text.
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